In the literature, existence of equilibria for discrete-time mean field games has been in general established via Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem. However, this fixed point theorem does not entail any iterative scheme for computing equilibria. In this paper, we first propose a Q-iteration algorithm to compute equilibria for mean-field games with known model using Banach Fixed Point Theorem. Then, we generalize this algorithm to model-free setting using fitted Q-iteration algorithm and establish the probabilistic convergence of the proposed iteration. Then, using the output of this learning algorithm, we construct an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent stochastic game with mean-field interaction between agents.
Introduction
We consider the learning of approximate Nash equilibria for stochastic dynamic games with a large number of identical agents in a mean-field interaction. The typical approach for studying such game models is to go to the infinite-population limit of the problem. This corresponds to considering mean-field games (MFG), which have been introduced by Huang, Malhamé, and Caines [23] and Lasry and Lions [25] to establish the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for continuous-time differential games with a large number of agents interacting through a mean-field term.
In mean-field games, a generic agent solves a Markov decision processes (MDP) with a constraint on the distribution of the state at each time step. The notion of equilibrium in the infinitepopulation limit is the mean-field equilibrium, which consists of a pair of a policy and a state measure. In order to be an equilibrium solution, this pair should satisfy Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle [23] which states that, under a given state measure, the policy should be optimal and when the generic agent applies this policy, the resulting distribution of the agent's state is same as the state measure. In continuous-time setting, solution of a Fokker-Planck equation evolving forward in time and a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation evolving backward in time gives the mean-field equilibrium.
Under mild assumptions, one can prove that the policy in mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for a finite-agent setting when the number of agents is sufficiently large. We refer the reader to [22, 35, 21, 5, 8, 9, 16, 28] for studies of continuous-time meanfield games with different models and cost functions, such as games with major-minor players, risk-sensitive games, games with Markov jump parameters, and LQG games.
Compared to continuous-time setting, discrete-time mean-field games have not been studied much in the literature. Reference [15] studies a discrete-time mean-field game with a finite state space over a finite horizon. In [1] , discrete-time mean-field game with countable state-space is studied under an infinite-horizon discounted cost criterion. References [13, 26, 29, 27] consider discrete-time mean-field games with linear state dynamics. References [32, 34] consider a discretetime mean-field game with Polish state and action spaces under the discounted cost optimality 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS criterion for fully-observed case and partially-observed case, respectively. In [33] , authors consider a discrete-time risk-sensitive mean-field game with Polish state and action spaces. References [6, 38, 37, 31 ] study discrete-time mean-field games subject to the average cost optimality criterion.
We note that the aforementioned works have only established the existence of mean-field equilibrium and no algorithm with convergence guarantee, even for known models, has been proposed to compute this mean-field equilibrium. In our recent work [2] , we study this problem for a very general class of models. We propose a value iteration algorithm and prove the convergence of this algorithm to the mean-field equilibrium. In this current paper, we generalize this algorithm to the model-free setting using fitted Q-learning [4] . Here, we use fitted Q-learning instead of the classical Q-learning algorithm because the action space is assumed to be a compact and convex subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. Convexity of the action space is quite necessary to establish that the operator in the value iteration algorithm is contractive.
In this paper, we propose a learning algorithm to compute an equilibrium solution for discretetime mean-field games under the discounted cost optimality criterion. In the literature, the existence of mean-field equilibria has been established for a very general class of discrete-time mean-field game models under the discounted cost [32] . However, learning discrete-time mean-field games has not been rigorously studied until recently. In [17] , authors develop a Q-learning algorithm to obtain mean-field equilibria for finite state-action mean-field games. The convergence analysis of this work heavily depends on the contractive behaviour of the operators involved in the algorithm, which is not proved but only stated as an assumption. However, it seems that these operators are proved to be contractive only if the action space is convex and the system components satisfy some convexity assumptions in terms of the action variable. Hence, with finite action spaces, it is probably not possible to establish that operators are contractive under mild assumptions. Therefore, this drawback may restrain the applicability of the learning algorithm. In [12] , authors establish a fictitious play iterative learning algorithm for compact state-action mean-field games, where the dynamics of the state and the one-stage cost function satisfy certain structure. They propose an error analysis of the learning algorithm for the game model with deterministic state dynamics (no noise term in the state dynamics). However, they do not precisely specify the conditions on the system components under which the error bound between learned equilibrium and mean-field equilibrium converges to zero. Reference [10] studies linear-quadratic mean-field control and establishes the convergence of policy gradient algorithm. In [14] , authors develop actor-critic algorithm to learn mean-field equilibrium for linear-quadratic mean-field games. Reference [39] considers a mean-field game in which agents can control their transition probabilities without any restriction. In this case, the action space becomes the set of distributions on the state space. Using this specific structure, they can transform mean-field game into an equivalent deterministic Markov decision process by enlarging the state and action spaces, and then, apply classical reinforcement learning algorithms to compute mean-field equilibrium. In [11] , a similar analysis is applied to mean-field control problems and authors establish the convergence of the Q-learning algorithm for deterministic systems.
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time mean-field game with stochastic non-linear state dynamics, where the state space is a finite set and action space is a compact subset of finite dimensional Euclidean space. Using fitted Q-iteration, we develop a learning algorithm to compute approximate mean-field equilibrium. We first establish the error analysis of the learning algorithm using pseudodimension of the function class on which Q-functions live. Then, using this error analysis, we prove that learned mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games if the number of agents is sufficiently large.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the mean-field game and define the mean-field equilibrium. In Section 2.1, we formulate the finite-agent version of the game problem. In Section 3, we propose a Q-iteration algorithm when the model is known. In Section 4 we propose and do the error analysis of fitted Q-learning algorithm for unknown model and prove that learned mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Notation. For a finite set E, we let P(E) and M (E) denote the set of all probability distributions on E and the set of real-valued functions on E, respectively. In this paper, P(E) is always endowed with l 1 -norm · 1 . We let m(·) denote the Lebesgue measure on appropriate finite dimensional Euclidean space R d . For any a ∈ R d and ρ > 0, let B(a, ρ) := {b : a − b ≤ ρ}, where · denotes the Euclidean norm. Let Q : E 1 × E 2 → R, where E 1 and E 2 are two sets. Then, we define Q min (e 1 ) := inf e 2 ∈E 2 Q(e 1 , e 2 ). The notation v ∼ ν means that the random element v has distribution ν.
Mean-field games and mean-field equilibria
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time mean-field game with state space X and action space A.
Here, X is a finite set with the discrete metric d X (x, y) = 1 {x =y} and A is a compact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space R dim A equipped with the Euclidean norm · . The state dynamics evolve according to the transition probability p : X × A × P(X) → P(X); that is, given current state x(t), action a(t), and state-measure µ, the next state x(t + 1) is distributed as follows:
In this model, a policy π is a conditional distribution on A given X. Let Π denote the set of all policies.
Although we name this model as mean-field game, it is indeed neither a game nor a Markov decision process (MDP) in the strict sense. This model is in between them. Similar to the MDP model, we have a single agent with a Markovian dynamics that has an objective function to minimize. However, similar to the game model, this agent should also compete with the collective behaviour of other agents. We model this collective behaviour by an exogenous state-measure µ ∈ P(X). By law of large numbers, this measure µ should be consistent with the state distribution of this single agent when agent applies its optimal policy. The precise mathematical description of the problem is given as follows.
If we fix a state-measure µ ∈ P(X), which represents the collective behavior of the other agents, a policy π * ∈ Π of a generic agent is optimal for µ if
is the discounted cost of policy π under the state-measure µ and the measurable function c : X × A × P(X) → [0, ∞) is the one-stage cost function. Here, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Given µ ∈ P(X), the evolution of the states and actions is governed by transition probability p : X×A×P(X) → P(X), policy π : X → P(A), and initial distribution µ 0 of the state; that is,
With these definitions, we can now define the optimality criteria of the model. To this end, we need to define two set-valued mappings.
We define the first set-valued mapping Ψ : P(X) → 2 Π as follows:
Ψ(µ) = {π ∈ Π : π is optimal for µ and µ 0 = µ}. 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Given µ, the set Ψ(µ) is the set of optimal policies for µ when the initial distribution is µ as well. Now, we define the second set-valued mapping Λ : Π → 2 P(X) as follows: for any π ∈ Π, the state-measure µ π ∈ Λ(π) if it is an invariant distribution of the transition probability P (·|x) = A p( · |x, a, µ π ) π(da|x); that is,
If there is no assumption on the transition probability p : X × A × P(X) → P(X), we may have Λ(π) = ∅ for some π. However, under Assumption 2.1 below, we always have non-empty Λ(π).
We can now define the notion of equilibrium for mean-field games via these mappings Ψ, Λ as follows.
Definition 2.1. A pair (π * , µ * ) ∈ Π × P(X) is a mean-field equilibrium if π * ∈ Ψ(µ * ) and µ * ∈ Λ(π * ).
In the literature, the existence of mean-field equilibria has been established for the discounted cost in [32] . In this paper, our goal is to develop a Q-learning algorithm for computing an approximate mean-field equilibrium under the model-free set-up. To that end, we define the following.
that is, instead of optimality, we require that π ε is ε-optimal.
With this definition, our goal now is to learn an ε-mean-field equilibrium using Q-learning algorithm. To this end, we will impose certain assumptions on the components of the mean-field game model. Before doing this, we need to define F :
Recall that M (X) denotes the set of real-valued functions on X. We may now state our assumptions.
(a) The one-stage cost function c satisfies the following Lipschitz bound:
(b) The stochastic kernel p( · |x, a, µ) satisfies the following Lipschitz bounds:
(c) A is convex. Moreover, there exists α > 0 such that for any a ∈ A and ρ > 0, we have
for every x,x, v,v, µ, andμ.
Let us motivate these conditions. First, conditions (a) and (b) are standard assumptions in MDP theory to obtain a rate of convergence bound for Q-learning algorithm. Condition (c) is needed to bound l ∞ -norm with l 2 -norm of Lipschitz continuous functions on A. Condition (d) is imposed to control the effect of the state-measure µ on the optimal policy. Indeed, this condition is equivalent to the standard assumption that guarantees Lipschitz continuity, with respect to unknown parameters, of the optimal solutions of the convex optimization problems [7, Theorem 4 .51].
Finite Agent Game
The mean-field game model defined in Section 2 is indeed the infinite-agent version of the finiteagent game model with mean-field interactions, which will be described in this section. In this model, there are N -agents and, for every time step t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and every agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, x N i (t) ∈ X and a N i (t) ∈ A denote the state and the action of Agent i at time t, respectively. Moreover,
denote the empirical distribution of the states of agents at time t, where δ x ∈ P(X) is the Dirac measure at x. For each t ≥ 0, next states (x N 1 (t + 1), . . . , x N N (t + 1)) of agents have the following conditional distribution given current states (x N 1 (t), . . . , x N N (t)) and actions (a N 1 (t), . . . , a N N (t)):
A policy π for a generic agent in this model is a conditional distribution on A given X; that is, agents can only use their individual states to design their actions. The set of all policies for Agent i is denoted by Π i . The initial states x N i (0) are independent and identically distributed according to µ 0 .
We let π (N ) := (π 1 , . . . , π N ), π i ∈ Π i , denote an N -tuple of policies for all the agents in the game. Under such an N -tuple of policies, for Agent i, the discounted cost is given by
The Nash equilibrium is defined for the finite-agent game model as follows. Definition 2.
3. An N -tuple of policies π (N * ) = (π 1 * , . . . , π N * ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if
We note that proving the existence of Nash equilibria is in general prohibitive for finite-agent game model due to the (almost) decentralized nature of the information structure of the problem (see [32, pp. 4259] ). Therefore, it is of interest to seek an approximate Nash equilibrium, whose definition is given below.
Definition 2.4. An N -tuple of policies π (N * ) = (π 1 * , . . . , π N * ) constitutes an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if
In finite-agent mean-field game model, if the number of agents is large enough, one can prove the existence of ǫ-Nash equilibrium by studying the infinite-agent limit N → ∞ of the game (i.e., mean-field game). In the infinite-agent case, the empirical distribution of the states can be modelled as an exogenous state-measure, which should be consistent with the distribution of a generic agent by the law of large numbers (i.e., mean-field equilibrium); that is, a generic agent should solve the mean-field game that is introduced in the preceding section. Then, it is possible to prove that if each agent in the finite-agent N game problem adopts the policy in mean-field equilibrium, the resulting N -tuple of policies will be an approximate Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N . This is indeed stated in the following theorem, which was proved in [32] .
Theorem 2.1. Let (π * , µ * ) be a mean-field equilibrium. Then, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a positive integer N (ǫ), such that, for each N ≥ N (ǫ), the N -tuple of policies π (N ) = {π * , π * , . . . , π * } is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game with N agents.
Proof. Note that, under Assumption 2.1, our model satisfies the conditions in [32, Assumptions 1, 2, and (j)]. Then, result follows by [32, Theorem 4.1] .
Note that it is also possible to prove that if each agent in the finite-agent game model adopts the ε-mean-field equilibrium policy, the resulting policy will be also an approximate Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N -agent game models. Indeed, this is the statement of the next theorem.
Theorem 2.2. Let (π ε , µ * ) be an ε-mean-field equilibrium. Then, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a positive integer N (ǫ), such that, for each N ≥ N (ǫ), the N -tuple of policies π (N ) = {π ε , π ε , . . . , π ε } is an ε + ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game with N agents.
Proof. For sufficiently large N , we need to prove that
for each i = 1, . . . , N . Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost functions are the same for all agents, it is sufficient to prove (2.1) for Agent 1 only. Given ǫ > 0, for each N ≥ 1, let π (N ) ∈ Π 1 be such that
Then, by [32, Corollary 4.11], we have
(π ε , π ε , . . . , π ε ). for all N ≥ N (ǫ). Theorem 2.2 implies that, by learning ε-mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-agent limit, one can obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for the original finite-agent game problem for which computing or learning the exact Nash equilibrium is in general prohibitive.
In the next section, we will first develop and study the convergence of an algorithm developed for exact computation of the mean-field equilibrium for infinite-agent game model. Then, we adopt this algorithm to the model-free setting and establish a learning algorithm to learn ε-mean-field equilibrium. Note that, by Theorem 2.2, the policy in the learned ε-mean-field equilibrium still constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent game model.
Algorithm for Known Model
In this section, we develop a Q-iteration algorithm to compute a mean-field equilibrium (π * , µ * ). To that end, in addition to Assumption 2.1, we assume the following. But, before that let us define the constants:
Assumption 3.1. We assume that
This assumption is used to ensure that the operator in Q-iteration is contractive, which enables us to use Banach fixed point theorem.
Note that, given any state-measure µ, the value function J µ of policy π with initial state x is given by
Then, the optimal value function is defined as J * µ (x) := inf π∈Π J µ (π, x). Using J * µ , we can characterize the set of optimal policies Ψ(µ) for µ as follows. Firstly, J * µ (x) is the unique fixed point of the Bellman optimality operator T µ , which is β-contractive with respect to · ∞ -norm:
Additionally, if f * : X → A attains the minimum in the equation above as follows
then the policy π * (a|x) = δ f * (x) (a) is optimal. We refer the reader to [19, Chapter 4] and [20, Chapter 8] for these classical results in MDP theory. We can also obtain a similar characterization by using Q-function instead of optimal value function J * µ . Indeed, we define the optimal Q-function as Q * µ (x, a) = c(x, a, µ) + β y∈X J * µ (y) p(y|x, a, µ). 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Note that Q * µ,min (x) := min a∈A Q * µ (x, a) = J * µ (x) for all x ∈ X, and so, we can write the equation above as:
where H µ is the Bellman optimality operator for Q-functions. It is straightforward to prove that H µ is a · ∞ -contraction with modulus β and the unique fixed point of H µ is Q * µ . Hence, we can develop a Q-iteration algorithm to compute Q * µ , and using Q * µ we can obtain the optimal policy. The advantage of this algorithm is that one can adapt this algorithm to the model-free setting via Q-learning.
Before, we state the Q-iteration algorithm for computing a mean-field equilibrium (π * , µ * ), let us first define the set, on which Q-functions live, in Q-iteration. This set C is the set of all Q-functions Q : Let us define H 1 : P(X) → C as H 1 (µ) = Q * µ (optimal Q-function) and H 2 : P(X) × C → P(X) as
where f Q (x) := arg min a∈A Q(x, a) is the unique minimizer by ρ-strong convexity of Q, for any Q ∈ C. Now, we can give the definition of the mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator as follows:
Our goal is to obtain mean-field equilibrium by iteratively applying the MFE operator H. To this end, we need to prove that H is contractive. In the following lemma, we prove that H 1 is contractive, which will later imply that H operator is also contractive.
Lemma 3.1. The mapping H 1 is a contraction with contraction constant K H 1 :=
Proof. First of all, H 1 is a well-defined function; that is, it maps any µ into C. Indeed, recall that Q * µ is the fixed point of the contractive operator H µ which is given as H µ Q(x, a) = c(x, a, µ) + β y∈X Q min (y) p(y|x, a, µ).
Using Assumption 2.1-(a),(b),(d), it is straightforward to prove that H µ maps any continuous Q : X × A → R into C. Hence, the fixed point Q * µ of H µ must be in C. Now, we prove that H 1 is K H 1 -contractive. For any µ,μ ∈ P(X), we have 
Proof. This result can be proved by following the same line of analysis in [2, Theorem 3.2]. However, for the sake of completeness, we give the full proof here.
Fix any µ,μ ∈ P(X). Note that, by Q * µ = H µ Q * µ , the mapping f Q * µ (x) is the unique minimizer of F (x, Q * µ,min , µ, ·). Similarly, f Q * µ (y) is the unique minimizer of F (y, Q * µ,min , µ, ·). For any x, y ∈ X, we define a = f Q * µ (x)
and
. As a = f Q * µ (x) is the unique minimizer of a strongly convex function F (x, Q * µ,min , µ, ·), we have
This is also true for a + r = f Q * µ (y) and F (y, Q * µ,min ,μ, ·). Therefore, by ρ-strong convexity of F in Assumption 2.1-(d) and [18, 
.
is Lipschitz continuous with respect to (x, µ). Using (3.5), we have
Note that (3.5) and Assumption 2.1-(b) lead to
Hence, (1) follows from [24, Lemma A2]. This completes the proof. Now, we know that, under Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 3.1, H is a contraction mapping. Therefore, by Banach Fixed Point Theorem, we can conclude that the following Q-iteration algorithm converges to the fixed point of H. Using the fixed point of H, we can then easily construct a mean-field equilibrium as stated in the theorem below.
Algorithm 1 Q-Iteration Algorithm
Start with µ 0 while µ n = µ n−1 do µ n+1 = H(µ n ) end while return Fixed-point µ * of H and Q * µ * = H 1 (µ * ) Theorem 3.1. Let (µ * , Q * µ * ) be the output of the above Q-iteration algorithm. Construct the policy π * (a|x) = δ f Q * µ * (x) (a). Then, the pair (π * , µ * ) is a mean-field equilibrium.
Proof. Note that (µ * , Q * µ * ) satisfy the following Here, (3.8) implies that π * ∈ Ψ(µ * ) and (3.7) implies that µ * ∈ Λ(π * ). Hence, (π * , µ * ) is a mean-field equilibrium.
Auxiliary Results
In the next section, we adopt the Q-iteration algorithm introduced in the preceding section to the model-free set-up. However, before doing so, we need to state and prove some auxiliary results that will be needed in the analysis of model-free learning algorithm. Let m A (·) := m(·)/m(A) be the uniform probability measure on A and let ν be some arbitrary probability measure on X. Then, for any g : X × A → R, we define its l 2 -norm as follows
The first result gives a bound on l ∞ -norm in terms of l 2 -norm for uniformly Lipschitz continuous functions g with respect to a.
Lemma 3.2. Let g : X × A → R be a uniformly Lipschitz continuous function in terms of a with Lipschitz constant L. Then, we have
where α > 0 is the constant in Assumption 2.1-(c).
Proof. Under Assumption 2.1-(c), the result can be proved following the same steps as in the proof of [3, Lemma D.2] . Hence, we omit the details.
Remark 3.1. In the remainder of this paper, to simplify the notation, we will always assume that
Therefore, the bound in Lemma 3.2 will always be in the following form:
Before we state the next result, we need to give some definitions. Let E be some set. Let G be a set of real-valued functions on E taking values in [0, K]. For any e 1:N := {e i } N i=1 ∈ E N , define the following semi-metric on G:
Then, for any ε > 0, let 
We now give the last auxiliary result. This result states that if the function Q is close to the optimal Q-function Q * µ for some µ, then the cost function of the minimizer of Q is also close to the optimal value function J * µ . 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Proposition 3.2. For any µ ∈ P(X), let Q * µ = H 1 (µ); that is,
Let us define the operator H π on Q-functions as
Then, it is straightforward to prove that H π is β-contractive with a unique fixed point Q π . Moreover, the cost function J µ (π, ·) of π is given by J µ (π, x) = Q π (x, π(x)).
Using these facts, we can now prove the proposition. First, we observe that
≤ sup
x,a β y∈X p(y|x, a, µ) |Q * µ,min (y) − Q min (y)| + |Q(y, π(y)) − Q * µ (y, π(y))|
This implies that Q * µ − Q π ∞ ≤ 2βε 1−β . Using this result, we can complete the proof as follows
Algorithm for Unknown Model
In this section, we develop a Q-learning algorithm to learn approximate mean-field equilibrium.
In this learning algorithm, in each iteration we have two stages. In the first stage, we learn the optimal Q-function Q * µ for a given µ using fitted Q-learning algorithm [4] . This stage replaces the operator H 1 in the model-based algorithm with a random operatorĤ 1 that will be described below. In this stage, we pick Q-functions from a fixed function class F ⊂ C. This function class F can be chosen as the set of neural networks with some fixed architecture or linear span of some finite number of basis functions or the set C itself. Depending on this choice, there will be an additional representation error in the learning algorithm. Let F min := {Q min : Q ∈ F}.
In the second stage, we update the state-measure by learning corresponding transition probability via simulation. This stage replaces the operator H 2 in the model-based algorithm with a random operatorĤ 2 . Below, we give the overall description of the algorithm first, and then, the descriptions of the stage 1 and the stage 2 along with their error analysis, respectively.
In the algorithm above, we have two random operatorsĤ 1 andĤ 2 . To describeĤ 1 , we need to give some definitions. Let us choose a probability measure ν on X. For instance, one can choose ν as the uniform distribution over X. We fix some policy π b such that, for any x ∈ X, the distribution π b (·|x) on A has a density with respect to Lebesgue measure m. To simplify the notation, we denote this density with π b (a|x) as well. We assume that π 0 := inf (x,a)∈X×A π b (a|x) > 0. Now, we can give the definition of the random operatorĤ 1 .
Algorithm 3 AlgorithmĤ 1 Inputs ([N, L], µ)
Start with Q 0 = 0 for l = 0, . . . , L − 1 do generate i.i.d. samples {(x t , a t , c t , y t+1 ) N t=1 } using
and set
Before we describe the second stageĤ 2 , we do the error analysis of algorithmĤ 1 . To this end, we need to define the following constants:
00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS
Remark 4.1. Since X is finite and C satisfies various regularity conditions, it is possible to prove that pseudo-dimensions of V C and V C min are finite. Hence, we can pick F = C. In this case, we can avoid representation error E(F), i.e., E(F) = 0. Otherwise, there will be a constant representation error in the learning algorithm. For instance, if one chooses to use neural networks or linear span of some finite number of basis functions, then E(F) may be small but positive.
The following theorem gives the error analysis of the algorithmĤ 1 .
Theorem 4.1. For any (ε, δ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 , with probability at least 1 − δ, we have
Here, the constant error ∆ is as a result of the representation error E(F) in the algorithm.
Proof. We mimic the error analysis developed in [3, Theorem 4.4] , but for the case of i.i.d. generated samples. Therefore, our analysis is much more simpler and for the sake of completeness, we give the full proof here.
For any real-valued function Q(x, a), recall the definition
Let Q l be the random Q-function at the l th -step of the algorithm. First, we find an upper bound to the following probability
for a given ε ′ > 0. To that end, we definê
One can show that (see [3, Lemma 4.1] )
where L * (Q) is some quantity independent of f . Since we do not need L * (Q) in the sequel, we do not give the precise definition here. It is sufficient to know that it does not depend on the first argument of L(f ; Q).
Using above definitions, we can obtain the following bound
This implies that
For any f, Q ∈ F, we define
Recall the constant L max := (1 + β)Q max + c max . One can prove that 0 ≤ l f,Q ≤ L 2 max m(A) π 0 =: C. Then, by Pollard's Tail Inequality [30, Theorem 24, p. 25] , we have
For any l f,Q and l g,T , we have (see [3, pp. 18] 
This implies that, for any ǫ > 0, we have
2) 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS where (1) follows from Lemma 3.3. Therefore, we have the following bound on the probability P 0 :
Recall the constants
Then, we can write (4.3) as follows
Hence, for each l = 0, . . . , L − 1, with probability at most δ ′
This implies that with probability at most δ ′
Using this, we can conclude that with probability at least 1 − δ ′
where (1) follows from Lemma 3.2. Recall the constants
Then, with probability at least 1 − δ ′ , we have We now give the description of the random operatorĤ 2 , and then, do the error analysis. In this algorithm, the goal is to replace the operator H 2 in the model-based algorithm, which gives the next state-measure, withĤ 2 . We achieve this by simulating the transition probability p(·|x, a, µ) for certain µ and policy π.
and define
For any (ε, δ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 , with probability at least 1 − δ
Proof. By Hoeffding Inequality [18, Theorem 2.1], for any x, y ∈ X, we have
Hence, we have
The result follows by picking δ = 2 |X| 2 e −M ε 2 |X| 2 . Now, we have completed the error analyses of the algorithmsĤ 1 andĤ 2 in Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2, respectively. Since the overall algorithmĤ is a composition ofĤ 1 withĤ 2 , we can obtain the following error analysis for the algorithmĤ. After we prove Theorem 4.3, we state the main result of this paper as a corollary. 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Theorem 4.3. Fix any (ε, δ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 . Define
Let K, L be such that
Then, pick N, M such that
Let (µ K , Q K ) be the output of the fitted Q-learning algorithmĤ with inputs
Then, with probability at least 1 − δ
where µ * is the state-measure in mean-field equilibrium. Moreover, with probability at least 1 − δ
Proof. First of all, the last statement follows from Theorem 4.1. To prove the first statement, note that for any µ ∈ P(X) and Q,Q ∈ C, we have As a = f Q (x) is the unique minimizer of a strongly convex function Q(x, a), we have
The same is true for a + r = fQ(x) andQ(x, a). Therefore, by strong convexity and [18, Lemma 3.2], we have −∇Q(x, a) T · r = −∇Q(x, a) T · r + ∇Q(x, a + r) T · r ≥ ρ r 2 . (4.9)
We also have −∇Q(x, a) T · r = −∇Q(x, a) T · r + ∇Q(x, a) T · r ≤ r ∇Q(x, a) − ∇Q(x, a) (4.10)
Combining (4.9) and (4.10) yields
where (1) 
This completes the proof. 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Now, we state the main result of this paper. It basically states that, by using fitted Q-learning algorithmĤ, one can learn approximate Nash equilibrium for the original finite-agent game problem. Define π K (x) := arg min a∈A Q K (x, a). Then, with probability at least 1 − δ(1 + 1 2K ), the pair (π K , µ * ) is a κ(ε, ∆)-mean-field equilibrium, where κ(ε, ∆) := 2
Therefore, by Theorem 2.2, an N -tuple of policies π (N ) = {π K , π K , . . . , π K } is an κ(ε, ∆) + ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game with N ≥ N (ǫ) agents.
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, with probability at least 1 − δ(1 + 1 2K ), we have
Let π K (x) := arg min a∈A Q K (x, a). By Proposition 3.2, with probability at least 1 − δ(1 + 1 2K ), we have J µ * (π * , ·) − J µ * (π K , ·) ∞ ≤ 2 1 1 − β ρ 2 (1 − K H ) 2 ε 2 64λ(K 1 ) 2 + ∆ + K H 1
Hence, (π K , µ * ) is κ(ε, ∆)-mean-field equilibrium with probability at least 1 − δ(1 + 1 2K ). Remark 4.2. Note that, in Corollary 4.1, there is a constant ∆, which depends on the representation error E(F). If we choose the function class F as C, then there will be no representation error, i.e, E(F) = 0, and so, ∆ = 0. Hence, in this case, we have the following error bound:
which goes to zero as ε → 0.
Conclusion
This paper has established a fitted Q-iteration algorithm for discrete time mean-field games subject to discounted cost criterion. Under certain regularity conditions on system components, we have proved that the policy obtained from the algorithm converges to the policy in mean-field equilibrium with some probabilistic convergence rate. We have then used the learned policy to construct an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite agent game problem.
